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Debating global justice with Carr: the crisis of laissez faire and the legitimacy 
problem in the twenty-first century 
Introduction 
‘A game of chess between a world champion and a schoolboy’ writes E. H. Carr, 
‘would be so rapidly and so effortlessly won that the innocent onlooker might be 
pardoned for assuming that little skill was necessary to play chess’ (Carr 1984, 103). 
Indeed, when power’s dominance is so great, the violence it inflicts becomes less 
visible. When the powerful is challenged, not only this violence becomes visible, but 
the status quo also faces a moral crisis. The Twenty Years’ Crisis was thus a political 
as well as a moral crisis: the challenge to British imperial power did not only make its 
violence visible, but also put to question the moral framework of nineteenth century 
laissez faire.1 Carr traces this moral crisis to the progress of the industrial revolution 
since the eighteenth century. This progress led to the socialisation of the nation: the 
transformation of the nation’s function from the nineteenth century protection of the 
private property of the ruling classes to the protection of the social and economic 
interests of the masses in the twentieth century (Carr 1945, 10-19). In light of this 
change, laissez faire became morally bankrupt – that is to say, it lacked legitimacy 
among the lesser privileged in the absence of a moral framework of rights and 
obligations to deliver political rights, as well as economic and social rights in line 
with the age of the socialised nation. 
Building on existing literature that examined the theme of morality in Carr 
(among others, see Johnston 2007; Kostagiannis 2017; Molloy 2009; Molloy 2014; 
Pashakhanlou 2018; Rich 2000; Scheuerman 2011), this paper situates Carr’s ethics in 
the context of the rise of the socialised nation – what Carr also refers to as ‘social 
nationalism’ – in the twentieth century.2 It specifically focuses on the link Carr draws 
between the latter development and the crisis of laissez faire due to its loss of 
legitimacy among the lesser privileged.3 The paper asks: how far is this link in Carr’s 
ethics relevant today? There are two interrelated aspects to this relevance – theoretical 
and empirical – that summarise the contribution of the paper. Theoretically, the paper 
argues, Carr’s analysis is relevant to the statist-cosmopolitan debate on global justice. 
It highlights the political vacuum in which this debate operates in the absence of a 
framework of rights and obligations under laissez faire. The consequence of this 
vacuum is that statist and cosmopolitan arguments on global justice become implicit 
in their acceptance of the violence committed by the status quo and lack the 
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legitimacy Carr deemed necessary for international justice in the age of the socialised 
nation. The significance of this theoretical critique lies in its empirical relevance in 
world politics today to which the paper turns next. Recently in this journal, Kamila 
Stullerova argued that ‘the renewed interest in the works of classical realists has not 
yet produced new research into contemporary international politics which would 
utilise classical realist theory’ (2017, 60). With the aim to produce such research, the 
paper applies Carr’s analysis to the resurgence of nationalism in the twenty-first 
century. Filtering through Carr’s theoretical insights presented in the former part of 
the paper, it argues that the resurgence of nationalism in world politics presents a 
narrative that renders the violence committed by the status quo under laissez faire 
once again visible. It thus shows that the problem of legitimacy is especially pressing 
today and calls for the debate on global justice to engage more seriously with Carr’s 
analysis of the crisis of laissez faire – specifically the legitimacy problem it raises in 
the twenty-first century. 
The argument develops in three stages. First, the paper presents an overview 
of Carr’s argument on morality and the crisis of laissez faire in the context of the rise 
of social nationalism in the twentieth century. Second, the paper engages Carr’s 
argument with the statist-cosmopolitan debate on global justice. Finally, the paper 
applies Carr’s theoretical argument to the resurgence of nationalism in the twenty-first 
century. 
 
Carr, morality and the crisis of laissez faire 
From early on, Carr’s analysis of morality in world politics has been charged with 
relativism.4 Despite this, there is an emerging consensus today that Morgenthau’s 
(1948) famous dismissal of Carr as a ‘utopian of power’ was simplistic (Haslam 2000, 
216; Molloy 2013, 270; Scheuerman 2011, 26). Instead, an important aspect of Carr’s 
morality has been consistently developed: a context specific morality that draws on 
his analysis of historical change (Germain 2000; Heath 2010; Molloy 2014; 
Kostagiannis 2017; Williams 2013). As Peter Wilson (2013) argued, Carr’s critique of 
utopianism cannot be understood separately from his analysis of the changing 
conditions under which the nineteenth century order survived. Thus, ‘taking a 
‘realistic’ view ultimately meant taking a view that was in line with prevailing 
material conditions’ (Wilson 2013, 49-50 emphasis in original). In his response to 
Whittle Johnston’s (1967) earlier critique of inconsistency in Carr’s body of work, 
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Graham Evans (1975) invoked a similar argument, highlighting Johnston’s neglect of 
‘the basic assumption that pervades most of [Carr’s] work, i.e. the conditioned 
character of thought and responses’ (1975, 84). Carr’s critique was thus not the 
harmony of interests per se, but its breakdown in the twentieth century given the 
changing conditions from the nineteenth-century (Evans 1975, 84).5 Carr’s ethics in 
this case, as Sean Molloy (2014) argued, proceed in pragmatic terms to provide 
contextual and concrete solutions within these changing conditions. 
Arash Pashakhanlou’s recent response to charges of relativism can be situated 
in this pragmatist reading of Carr’s ethics. Contra relativist charges, Pashakhanlou 
argues that ‘fairness, defined as a judgment free from self-interest and deception in 
which the relevant parties are treated in an acceptable way under the given situation, 
is the ethical concern of Carr’ (2018, 2). Carr’s concern with fairness and deception 
can be seen in his redefinition of the concept of peace. Peace to Carr does not simply 
mean the absence of war, but to also regard the concerns of the lesser privileged in the 
status quo through economic redistribution and social justice (Rich 2000, 207; Molloy 
2009, 99). Without the latter purpose of peace, ‘international morality’ is ‘little more 
than a convenient weapon for belabouring those who assailed the status quo’ (Carr 
1984, 147). In other words, peace is not only unfair but also the deceptive plea of the 
privileged seeking to maintain their privileges in the status quo. But ‘unfairness’ and 
‘self-deception’ to Carr also became impractical as far as peace was concerned in the 
context of the twentieth century. Carr’s ‘fairness’ thus entails a pragmatic solution to 
the changing conditions of the international order from nineteenth century liberalism. 
In other words, fairness is Carr’s moral guide under new conditions where nineteenth 
century liberalism became morally and politically bankrupt. This of course raises the 
question: what are the historical changes that morally and politically bankrupted 
nineteenth century liberalism and necessitated ‘fairness’ to restore peace by making 
the status quo legitimate to both the privileged and the lesser privileged? 
In a crucial, albeit neglected, passage in The Twenty Years Crisis, Carr 
summarises the most crucial change in world politics since the industrial revolution. 
‘By curious coincidence’ Carr says, 
 
‘the year which saw the publication of The Wealth of Nations was also the year 
in which Watt invented his steam engine. Thus, at the very moment when 
laissez-faire theory was receiving its classical exposition, its premises were 
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undermined by an invention which was destined to call into being immobile, 
highly specialized, mammoth industries and a large and powerful proletariat 
more interested in distribution than in production’ (1984, 44). 
 
The rise of this ‘powerful proletariat’ meant ‘the class which might be more interested 
in the equitable distribution of wealth than its maximum production’ became 
significant and influential (Carr 1984, 44). This led to the ‘socialisation of the nation’ 
bringing ‘for the first time … the economic claims of the masses into the forefront of 
the nation’ (Carr 1945, 19). In the nineteenth century, the demands of the ‘socialised 
nation’ were overshadowed by expansionism and empire: ‘since fresh marked were 
constantly becoming available; it postponed the class issue, with its insistence on the 
primary importance of equitable distribution, by extending to members of the less 
prosperous classes some share in the general prosperity’ (Carr 1984, 44-45). Thus, 
‘perpetual expansion’ became ‘the hypothesis on which liberal democracy and laissez 
faire economics were based’ (Carr 1943, 106), and ‘under the growing strains of the 
latter half of the nineteenth century, it was perceived that competition in the economic 
sphere implied exactly what Darwin proclaimed as the biological law of nature – the 
survival of the stronger at the expense of the weaker’ (Carr 1984, 47). In other words, 
nineteenth century laissez faire was far from peaceful: ‘the whole ethical system was 
built on the sacrifice of the weaker brother’ (Carr 1984, 49). Despite this, under the 
dominance of British supremacy and with perpetual expansion being the order of the 
day, its violence against the lesser privileged was less visible. 
By the early twentieth century, imperialism reached its limit and British 
supremacy was challenged. As a result, nineteenth century laissez faire faced both a 
political and a moral crisis. On the one hand, it became insufficient to maintain peace, 
and was replaced with ‘total wars’ between socialised nations seeking to protect the 
economic and social interests of the masses (Carr 1945, 26). On the other hand, it 
became illegitimate among the lesser privileged; whose nationalism rendered the 
violence committed by the status quo against their social and economic interests 
visible. The rise of social nationalism in the twentieth century was thus not simply a 
manifestation of irrationality contra a peaceful and rational liberal order. Nor was it 
simply due to the ubiquity of evil in politics to be tamed with ‘the lesser evil’ a la 
Morgenthau (Molloy 2009). Rather, it exposed the moral bankruptcy of the liberal 
rationalist assumption that ‘the highest interest of the individual and the highest 
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interest of the community naturally coincide’ among nations, as among individuals, in 
the age of the socialised nations (Carr 1984, 42). Carr thus argued that a new ‘moral 
purpose’ was required, one which established a framework of rights and obligations in 
line with the age of the socialised nation – that is to say, which delivered not only 
political rights, but also economic and social rights ‘thus to make democracy once 
more a reality’ (Carr 1943, 119). So far, Carr argued, only war provided this moral 
framework. Thus war played an important moral function: providing employment and 
reducing inequality. ‘The war of 1914-1918’ for example, ‘did more than any other 
event of the past hundred years to mitigate the more glaring forms of economic and 
social inequality’ (Carr 1943, 115). ‘It is’ therefore, ‘useless today to condemn the 
economic consequences of large-scale war because it is destructive of accumulated 
wealth … so long as it mitigates the evils of unemployment and inequality’ (Carr 
1943, 115). To avoid war more is needed than simply condemning it as ‘irrational’: 
‘we cannot escape from war until we have found some other moral purpose powerful 
enough to generate self-sacrifice on the scale requisite to enable civilisation to 
survive’ (Carr 1943, 116). 
Carr’s ‘moral purpose’ translated in practice into a quest for post-national 
planning: ‘multinational social and economic units’ as Scheuerman argues, ‘to 
generate social and economic equality within as well as between and among national 
units’ (2011, 76-77 emphasis in original). Furthermore, Carr endorsed Mitrany’s 
functionalism to check the latter’s ‘potentially dangerous centralising tendencies’ 
(Scheuerman 2010, 261).6 Despite this endorsement however Carr also, as Kenealy 
and Kostagiannis argue, rejected Mitrany’s depoliticised functionalism that ‘saw the 
possibility of separating the political, economic and social spheres’ (2013, 238-239 
note 84). Carr thus tied functionalism to ‘a collectivist vision in which functional 
organisations operated alongside traditional socialist-style state economic planning in 
building the foundations of post-national order’ (Scheuerman 2010, 264). This 
distinction between Carr and Mitrany is important because it highlights a counter-
hegemonic critique built in Carr’s realism that may for example form the basis for a 
critique of the political economy of the EU, particularly in times when the latter fails 
to provide a substitute for the social function of nationalism: redistribution, economic 
justice, and social solidarity.7 
The centrality of the social function of nationalism is one of the most enduring 
themes in Carr’s body of work. Writing in 2013, for example, Kenealy and 
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Kostagiannis argued that ‘The public discourse in different states during the current 
eurozone crisis … demonstrates how the embedded characteristics of the socialised 
nations are still alive and well in the public consciousness’ (2013, 244). With the 
benefit of hindsight one may add that social nationalism is ever more present today in 
the public consciousness, reasserting itself where the legitimacy of supranational units 
and governments in existing federal states are put to question. Thus, although Carr’s 
contextual judgments on appeasement and the USSR are irrelevant today, his 
theoretical analysis of historical change and its impact on the crisis of laissez faire in 
the age of the socialised nation remains enduring. As Kenealy and Kostagiannis 
conclude, ‘decades on from the publication of Nationalism and After, the challenges 
posed by the third phase of nationalism remain unanswered’ (2013, 244). A key 
challenge here is to provide a framework of rights and obligations that delivers not 
only political rights, but also economic and social rights to the lesser privileged in 
times of peace. In the absence of such a framework, the status quo operates in a 
political vacuum that perpetuates the violence committed by laissez faire and thus 
lacks legitimacy among the lesser privileged. This vacuum presents an important 
challenge to the statist-cosmopolitan debate on global justice today, to which the 
following section turns. 
 
Debating global justice with Carr 
A growing number of scholars today engage with the normative dimension in 
classical realism (among others, see Behr and Roesch 2012; Karkour 2018; Williams 
2004). Contra earlier cosmopolitan critiques of realism (Held 1995; Hayden 2005), 
Richard Beardsworth (2008) presented the case for the theoretical convergence 
between cosmopolitanism and classical realism. David Miller recently concluded that 
‘global political theory would benefit from a dose of realism’ (2016, 229). More 
recently, Pashakhanlou noted that ‘Carr’s concern with fairness overlaps with the 
interests of Rawlsians in IR and the conception of justice as fairness’ (2018, 12). To 
the extent that Carr was concerned with the individual and fairness respectively, this 
paper concurs that there is an affinity between his ethics on the one hand, and 
cosmopolitans and Rawlsians on the other. There is also, however, an important 
strand in Carr’s theoretical analysis, his counter-hegemonic critique, which may 
reveal the Achilles heel in statist and cosmopolitan arguments on global justice – 
specifically, the political vacuum in which such arguments operate in the absence of a 
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framework of rights and obligations under laissez faire. The consequence of this 
vacuum is that these arguments become implicit in their acceptance of the violence 
committed by the status quo and lack the legitimacy Carr deemed necessary for 
international justice in the age of the socialised nation. 
 To be sure, the framework of rights and obligations on the international level 
is not a desired goal among all theorists of global justice. Statists for example reject 
the framework of rights and obligations that is centered on the individual rather than 
nations (Nagel 2005; Miller 2007; Walzer 1983) and / or peoples (Rawls 1999; Eckert 
2015; Tong 2017). In rejecting this framework, however, statists become implicit in 
their acceptance of the violence committed by the status quo under laissez faire. 
Critics for example argued that the defence of national political communities does not 
address the global structural injustices committed by laissez faire due to, for instance, 
the exploitative nature of global capitalist markets (Ypi 2010, 550), against 
individuals in ‘lesser privileged’ nations (Williams 2014, 208). 
 The implicit acceptance of the violence committed by the status quo under 
laissez faire can also be seen in the statist argument centered on the Rawlsian 
‘peoples’ (Rawls 1999; Eckert 2015; Tong 2017). Thomas Doyle (2015) argues that 
under certain conditions of intense securitization, for example, in the case of nuclear 
deterrence or the US war on Iraq (2003), Rawls’ liberal peoples can turn into outlaw 
states. What is significant here is what Doyle’s critique reveals: that Rawls’ liberal / 
outlaw categories are not only unstable but can also overlap. This does not only reveal 
the violence liberal peoples commit in particular contexts, but also the violence 
Rawls’ categories allow more generally. The latter is further exemplified in Charles 
Beitz’s critique of the Law of Peoples. Beitz argues that Rawls’ primary concern is 
international stability: ‘liberal and decent peoples do not tolerate states that violate 
human rights (‘‘outlaw states’’) because such states ‘‘are aggressive and dangerous’’ ’ 
(2000, 685). As Beitz argues however, ‘it is not hard to think of regimes which are 
oppressive domestically but whose international conduct is not ‘‘aggressive and 
dangerous’’ ’ (2000, 685). Beitz here reveals that human rights violations that persons 
endure due, for example, the suppression of democratic rights is omitted from Rawls’ 
human rights list for the category of ‘decent hierarchical’ people. By blurring the line 
between tyrannical and hierarchical states (Hayden 2003, 313), this category once 
again allows for human wrongs to be committed, which are incompatible with the age 
of the socialised nation where governments must heed to their people’s political rights 
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and where these rights are extended to the economic and social realms (Carr 1945, 18-
19). 
The statist response is that international justice requires a measure of respect 
for cultures, which are not liberal. The socialised nation however is not a ‘Western’ or 
‘liberal’ phenomenon. It was the raison d’etre of anti-colonial movements, for 
example pan-Arab nationalism led by Nasser and spread across the Arab world in the 
1950s and 1960s. While Carr did not have anti-colonial movements in mind when 
theorising the socialised nation, he linked his analysis of the ‘social revolution’ in 
Europe to the ‘colonial revolution’ in Asia and Africa (1951, 94). Thus Carr 
suggested, ‘capital investment, technical aid, planned national economies, planned 
international trade’ so that economies in former colonies are not ‘placed at the mercy 
of a fluctuating and unprotected international market’ (1951, 97).8 
At this stage Carr’s realism seems closer to cosmopolitan theories than to 
statitsts (Linklater 1997; Scheuerman 2011). Indeed, while there is pluralism within 
cosmopolitanism,9 cosmopolitan theorists concur with Carr that ‘the driving force 
behind any future international order must be a belief, however expressed, in the 
value of individual human beings irrespective of national affinities or allegiance and 
in a common and mutual obligation to promote their well-being’ (Carr 1945, 44). 
Thus cosmopolitan theorists castigate Rawls for substituting the equality between 
Peoples for the rights of individuals (Beitz 2000; Buchanan 2000; Caney 2002; 
Hayden 2005; Held 1995; Kuper 2000). Despite this, cosmopolitans are challenged to 
provide a substitute for the social function of nationalism. When this challenge is not 
met, Carr’s counter-hegemonic critique firstly reveals that in the absence of a 
framework of rights and obligations under laissez faire cosmopolitan theories are 
‘utopian’ in their failure to translate liberal ideals from theory to practice. Secondly, it 
reveals that in this failure cosmopolitan theories become implicit in their acceptance 
of the violence committed by the status quo and lack legitimacy among the lesser 
privileged. This critique applies across the various strands in cosmopolitanism, to 
which the discussion now turns. 
According to Thomas Pogge’s institutional cosmopolitanism, ‘the fulfillment 
of human rights importantly depends on the structure of our global institutional order’ 
(Pogge 2000, 56). Here is an acknowledgement that the global institutional order 
commits avoidable violence in the form of global poverty (Hayden 2010, 461). To say 
that this violence is avoidable and to represent an institutional theory to avoid it is not 
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the same as explaining the conditions under which there is a political will to follow 
the dictates of such theory. One challenge Carr raised in his work was that no such 
will existed in times of peace. Recent history shows that this is challenge has not been 
met. This can be seen, for example, in the context of the post-Cold War era, where in 
the absence of major war and / or the Soviet threat laissez faire turned the epoch into 
one with the largest economic inequality and social injustice since the early twentieth 
century (Piketty 2014). Carr’s insight that only war provides a common moral 
purpose that advances institutional reform for the benefit of both the rich and the poor 
thus remains enduring. Short of war, the liberal economic order does not only increase 
the gap between the rich and the poor in times of peace, but also renders invisible the 
violence caused against the poor in the form of economic hardship, unemployment 
and the related increasing levels of stress, depression and anxiety that follow such 
living conditions (Pickett and Wilkinson 2018). 
Contra this background, Seyla Benhabib argues that ‘many of the international 
human rights covenants contain … provisions against the exploitative spread of 
market freedoms’ (2009a, 694). While this may be true in theory, in practice human 
rights proved to be ‘perfectly compatible with inequality, even radical inequality’ 
(Moyn 2018, 30). ‘The tragedy of human rights’ thus Samuel Moyn continues, ‘is that 
they have occupied the global imagination but so far contributed little of note, merely 
nipping at the heels of the neo-liberal giant whose path goes unaltered and un-
resisted’ (2018, 31). In other words, the human rights regime operates within the 
framework of laissez faire and thus lacks a common framework of rights and 
obligations – so necessary as Onora O’Neil (2005) forcefully argued – to address 
material inequality in the absence of the extreme political necessity of war. Thus the 
challenge Carr’s work poses remains intact, namely that the problem of inequality 
‘can be solved in time of war because war provides an aim deemed worthy of self-
sacrifice’ and that ‘it cannot be solved in time of peace because modern civilisation 
recognises no peace-time aim for which people are prepared to sacrifice themselves in 
the same way’ (1943, 101). And Catherine Lu is right to conclude that it is ‘not the 
lack of resources that makes the eradication of global poverty, or the reduction global 
inequalities, unrealistic’ but the lack of ‘moral vision’ (2005, 407-408). Except that 
one needs to add the caveat that this ‘moral vision’ needs not only to develop in 
theory, but also translate into a common moral purpose in practice. It needs, as 
Nicholas Rengger argues, ‘to get those in the world or practice to pay attention … 
	   10	  
since their interests might well dictate they should act otherwise’ (2005, 368). 
One response here is that theories of global justice are not concerned with 
Carr’s concern, which is a failure of politics to conform to morality in practice. 
Indeed, in a footnote in Law of Peoples, John Rawls distinguishes his realistic utopia 
from Carr’s analysis of utopia and realism. ‘In contradistinction to Carr’ Rawls 
writes, ‘my idea of a realistic utopia … sets limits to the reasonable exercise of 
power’ (1999, 6). In other words, whereas Carr’s concern is the compromise between 
morality and power in practice, Rawls’ task is to devise the moral limits of power in 
theory. The problem with Rawls’ stance here, shared across the various strands in 
cosmopolitanism is, as Matt Sleat argues, that ‘politics’ to these theories, ‘is only 
attended at the second stage of applying the moral theory of cosmopolitanism in 
practice’ (2016, 174). Thus, it ‘does not enter the picture at the initial stage of 
deciding the grounds, scope and content of those principles themselves’ (2016, 174). 
This problem becomes especially acute when, as a result of practical failure, these 
‘principles’ do not remain principles but become representative of special interests. 
For example, when those in the world practice act, as they do, according to their 
interests as Rengger argues, the notion of ‘citizens of the world’ (Archibugi 1995, 
449; Benhabib 2009b, 41), and the cosmopolitan agents, be ‘democratic states’ (Held 
1995, 232; Pogge 2000), or ‘responsible cosmopolitan states’ (Garrett-Brown 2011), 
either become representatives of class interests – a meritocratic, well educated, 
mobile, class (Goodhart 2017), or the interests of powerful nations (Chandler 2003; 
Sleat 2016), or both. In either case, cosmopolitan theories become implicit in their 
acceptance of the violence committed by the status quo under laissez faire to protect 
such elite and/or state interests and lack legitimacy among the lesser privileged. 
Under these circumstances, Carr’s realism becomes a corrective ‘weapon’ (Dunne 
2000), a counter-hegemonic force (Wilson 2009, 22-23), against the stagnant waters 
of the status quo. 
None of this means that only negative goals in global justice can be 
legitimated in practice (Sleat 2016, 181). Rather, the point is that when practice fails 
to conform, cosmopolitan arguments do not stand still: they join the ranks of the 
statists in their acceptance of the violence within the status quo and thus lack the 
legitimacy Carr deemed necessary for international justice in the age of the socialised 
nation. The following section argues that this critique is not simply matter of 
theoretical exercise, but with empirical consequences. Specifically, the loss of 
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legitimacy is a pressing issue today with consequences for the resurgence of 
nationalism in world politics and the narrative the latter presents, which renders the 
violence committed by the status quo under laissez faire once again visible. 
 
Nationalism in the twenty-first century 
This is of course not the first attempt to apply Carr’s work to a contemporary analysis 
of world politics. In 1998 Review of International Studies published a special issue on 
the ‘eighty years’ crisis’ applying ‘Carr’s critique of liberal illusions’ to the liberal 
triumphalism of the 1990s (Dunne et al 1998, vi). Scholars later examined the 
relevance of Carr’s analysis to the post-Cold War liberal order (Cox 2010; Johnston 
2007; Kostagiannis 2018), and the debate on sovereignty (Karp 2008). Carr’s take on 
global reform (Barrinha 2016; Scheuerman 2011), and relevance to European 
integration (Kenealy and Kostagiannis 2013), were also examined in recent years. 
This section extends the application of Carr’s analysis to the recent resurgence of 
nationalism in the twenty-first century. The cases chosen to this end are Brexit and 
Trump. Brexit and Trump are particularly relevant to Carr’s analysis because they are 
in line with his argument that nationalist backlashes are not simply characteristic of 
illiberal societies or societies in transition to democracy, but intrinsic to the liberal 
order. 
Before the paper proceeds with the empirical analysis, the method requires 
further justification. Specifically, do changes in world politics since Carr’s writing 
preclude any attempt to understand the present using Carr’s analysis? On the liberal 
order, for example, Paul Hirst (1998, 142) argued that its social and political context 
has changed since Carr’s writing, with the rise of trading blocs such as the EU and 
NAFTA, which ‘are not aimed at promoting closure like the old autarkic blocs’ and 
institutions such as the IMF, WB and WTO regulating the world economy and 
fostering multilateralism. There is no question that, as Hirst and others (for example, 
Ikenberry 2009) argued, the liberal order progressed since 1945, with the world 
economy becoming more institutionalised and multilateral under US leadership. 
Despite this, since the 1970s laissez faire saw a ‘remarkable revival …  in the form of 
market economics, the privatization of state-owned industries and the trimming of 
welfare benefits by liberal democracies’ (Jahn 2018, 56). The demise of the USSR 
removed a further obstacle in the advancement of laissez faire. In light of these 
changes, the current crisis of liberalism is more than simply a ‘crisis of authority’ 
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(Ikenberry 2015, 451). Rather, it is linked to the revival of laissez faire, which 
disembodied the economy and ‘put market liberalism squarely at odds with another 
part of liberalism: democratic theory and its notions of distributive justice’ 
(Kratochwil 1998, 214). For liberal institutions, as Scheuerman argued, have 
‘insufficiently contributed to countering material inequalities which not only breed 
injustice and disorder but also impede progress towards an integrated supranational 
society’ (2011, 166). In other words, the revival of laissez faire meant that the liberal 
order created a tension between liberalism and democracy, internationalism and 
nationalism, at the heart of the violence implicit in the post-Cold War status quo. The 
Brexit and Trump campaigns in this case presented a narrative that made this violence 
once again visible, highlighting Carr’s legitimacy problem in the twenty-first century. 
 
Brexit and Trump 
The crisis of laissez faire is due to its failure to bring about a framework of rights and 
obligations that delivers not only political rights but also social and economic rights in 
line with the age of the socialised nation. This failure can take place even as there is 
material progress in society. For the loss the lesser privileged endure is not extreme 
poverty but economic and socio-political exclusion. Due to this exclusion, the lesser 
privileged become ‘vulnerable and marginalized enough to be superfluous’ (Hayden 
2010, 464). So how did the lesser privileged become ‘superfluous’ in the context of 
post-Cold War British and American politics? 
In British politics, although the process of exclusion can be traced to the rise 
of market fundamentalism during the Thatcher years, it is in the Blair years and the 
rise of the Blair/Cameron consensus that it became a fait accomplit. Blair’s embrace 
of globalisation in the famous Chicago speech and subsequent open door policy 
towards the EU resulted in low skilled immigration that intensified the labour 
competition in the British market. Thus, ‘1 per cent increase in the share of migrants 
… produced a 0.6 percent decline in the wages of the 5 percent lowest-paid workers’ 
meanwhile, ‘immigration was associated with an increase in the wages of higher-paid 
workers’ further widening overall social inequality (Clarke et al 2017, 113). Given 
that these changes took place under a new labour government, the crisis became 
twofold: not only social but also political. The economic interests of the low skilled 
workers were not only threatened, but also excluded from the mainstream democratic 
process. This exclusion became visible in the demographic changes of the Labour 
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vote, which saw a significant decrease of working class vote from the political 
mainstream. Thus, ‘in the 2010 election [the Labour party’s] middle class vote of 4.4 
million just outstripped its working class vote of 4.2 million for the first time’. 
Whereas, in ‘1997 the working class Labour vote of 8 million comfortably outstripped 
the middle class vote of 5.5 million’ (Goodhart 2017, 75). This move towards 
Diploma Democracy (Bovens and Wille 2017), where those lacking a diploma are 
visibly absent from the democratic process became a key characteristic of the era of 
the ‘Blair-Cameron consensus’. So much, in fact, that the Economist noted: ‘thanks to 
Brexit and the collapse of the Blair-Cameron consensus, the forgotten citizen is 
finally being remembered’ (Economist 2018a, 30). 
A similar process of exclusion took place in American politics, where ‘the 
annual real minimum wage (in 2015 US dollars) fell from 19,237 in 1975 to 13,000 in 
2005’ (Mazzuccato 2018, 129). ‘Financial firms and major corporations’ thus Jeff 
Colgan and Robert Keohane argue, ‘enjoyed privileged status within the order’s 
institutions, which paid little attention to the interests of workers’ (2017, 39). As with 
British foreign policy under Blair, this was complemented with a military 
adventurism that had little relation to the social and economic interests of the US 
worker. ‘This position’ Colgan and Keohane continue, ‘is reminiscent of the way that 
eighteenth century French aristocrats refused to pay taxes while indulging in 
expensive foreign military adventures’ (2017, 39). 
It is in this context that the lesser privileged became ‘superfluous’ in post-Cold 
War British and American politics. To the superfluous, the liberal order was only 
peaceful at the surface, for economically, socially and politically speaking the status 
quo was violent and exclusionary. The Brexit and Trump campaigns in this case 
presented a narrative that highlighted this violence implicit in the status quo 
undergoing a crisis of democracy. Thus, for example, in his speech on Brexit, Boris 
Johnson explained the fate of democracy at stake in a speech on 26 May 2016, 
 
‘We cannot control the numbers. We cannot control the terms on which people 
come and how we remove those who abuse our hospitality … it is terrible for 
our democracy. People have watched Prime Minister after Prime Minister make 
promises on immigration that cannot be met because of the EU and this has 
deeply damaged faith in our democratic system’ (Johnson 2016). 
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As Goodwin and Milazzo (2017) recently argued, therefore, Brexit was not simply the 
result of hostility towards migrants, of ‘closed’ versus ‘open’ politics, but the ability 
to regain control over democracy. In other words, the Brexit campaign presented a 
narrative where the liberal status quo committed violence against the British workers, 
now excluded from democratic political processes and substituted for ‘experts’. Nigel 
Farage was not alone in presenting this narrative. Michael Gove for example 
famously said ‘I think people in this country have had enough of experts’ (cited in 
Wilson 2017, 544). What distinguishes Farage is his populist style of political 
communication (Bosssetta 2017). This style is built on the sharp opposition between 
the liberal protagonist: the ‘multinationals’, ‘big merchant banks’, ‘big politics’, and 
democracy the ‘ordinary people’. In his victory speech, for example, Farage declared 
‘a victory for ordinary people. A victory for decent people’ who ‘have fought against 
the multinationals … the big merchant banks … big politics’ (Farage 2016). Carr 
already anticipated the success of this style of politics in the age of the socialised 
nation when he prophesised that ‘the new faith’ in any future order ‘will make its 
appeal predominantly to the ‘‘little man’’ ’ and will thus, ‘proclaim its independence  
… of big business, of trade unions and of the great political parties – and aim at the 
emancipation of society from the vested interests which they have come to represent’ 
(1943, 118-119). By pointing out the British government’s failure to take into account 
the interest of ‘little man’, Farage’s narrative made the violence implicit in the post-
Cold War British status quo visible and highlighted the legitimacy problem the latter 
raised in the context of British politics. 
The Trump campaign likewise highlighted the violence implicit in the liberal 
status quo due its exclusionary consequences and substitution for donors, lobbyists 
and special interests (Lake 2018, 14). Trump associated the latter interests with his 
opponent, Hilary Clinton, and for himself he declared: ‘I’m using my own money. 
I’m not using the lobbyists. I’m not using donors. I don’t care. I’m really rich’ 
(Trump 2016a). On various issues, from unemployment to social inequality to foreign 
policy, Trump consistently framed his narrative in terms of two conflicting interests: 
elites and masses, big business and the ‘little man’. On social inequality, for example, 
Trump announced that the system is ‘rigged by big donors who want to keep down 
wages. It is rigged by big businesses who want to leave our country … it is rigged 
against you, the American people’ (Trump 2016b). Trump’s narrative then promised 
to speak on behalf of the little man: ‘I am running for President to end this unfairness 
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and to put you, the American worker, first’ (Trump 2016b). These remarks, as well as 
the reference to ‘unfairness’, make sense in the context of an important development 
theorised by Carr: the advent of the socialised nation and thus, the expectation that 
‘the primary aim of national policy’ is ‘to minister to the welfare of members of the 
nation and to enable them to earn their living’ (Carr 1945, 19). By pointing out the 
American government’s failure in this aim, the Trump campaign’s narrative made the 
violence implicit in the post-Cold War American status quo visible and highlighted 
the legitimacy problem the latter raised in the context of American politics. 
A crucial insight to be gained from the analysis of Brexit and Trump through 
the prism of Carr is that social nationalism remains enduring. Thus, to dismiss Carr’s 
analysis of the tension between the haves and the have-nots’ as a source of instability 
in the post-Cold War era as irrelevant is premature (Johnston 2007, 174). 
Furthermore, Carr’s adherence to socialism and the cause of the lesser privileged is 
far from ‘uncritical’ (Johnston 2007, 158). Rather, it is, as Molloy (2014) argues, a 
pragmatic response to real world problems that recent events have shown to be 
enduring and in need of concrete solutions. This is not to say that there has been no 
change in world politics since Carr’s writing. Since the 1970s technological change 
and the globalisation of the workforce have been key contributors in the revival of 
laissez faire (Colgan and Keohane 2017; Jahn 2018), and resurgence of nationalism 
(Pettman 1998). 10  None of this however discounts Carr’s analysis of social 
nationalism. It rather means that the social and colonial revolutions have become 
more closely interlinked today than in Carr’s time, calling for post-national social and 
economic planning on a wider scale. Thus Carr’s ethical response to the ‘little man’, 
which, by contrast to Trump and Farage today, meant transcending the nationalist 
solution, is more relevant than ever. For while the peculiar conditions of the 1930s are 
not necessarily present today for nationalism to culminate in war, the disruptive force 
of social nationalism has not faded either, putting to question the ‘harmony of 
interests’ in the twenty-first century liberal order. 
The Trump case adds two further insights. First, government, though 
necessary (Scheuerman 2011), is insufficient to resolve the legitimacy problem that 
arises with social nationalism. Second, the legitimacy problem transcends the tension 
between states, whether in terms of conflict between intergovernmentalism and 
supranationalism (Kenealy and Kostagiannis 2013, 245), or power transition between 
rising and dominant powers (Kostagiannis 2018). The legitimacy problem rather 
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pertains to a broader question: the current moral and political crisis due to the revival 
of laissez faire and the violence committed by the status quo against the lesser 
privileged between as well as within states. By rendering this violence visible, Brexit 
and Trump also highlighted the legitimacy problem in the twenty-first century liberal 
order. 
 
Conclusion 
During the years of liberal triumphalism – that is to say, prior to the 9/11, the 2003 
Iraq War and 2008 global economic crisis, many scholars dismissed Carr’s analysis of 
the crisis of laissez faire as irrelevant to the contemporary world. R W. Davies for 
example argued that Carr was mistaken in his interpretation of the direction of history 
and the collapse of the USSR ‘would have appalled’ him (2000, 107). Paul Rich noted 
that Carr ‘failed to detect the intellectual rejuvenation in western liberalism in the 
years after Hayek published The Road to Serfdom in 1944’ (2000, 212). To Fred 
Halliday the collapse of the USSR meant that Carr’s ‘work on revolution has, to a 
considerable degree, failed’ the test of time (2000, 276). The first decade of the 
twenty-first century presented a turning point in favour of Carr. As the Economist 
recently put it, following the 2008 financial crisis ‘the idea that markets, left to their 
own devices, will efficiently and fairly allocate resources’ has no more appeal among 
the public (Economist 2018b, 68). Nor does ‘the idea that trade makes everyone better 
off in the long run’ (Economist 2018b, 68). It is significant that these remarks come 
from the Economist, a champion of liberalism. For they echo Carr’s critique of laissez 
faire, and put a case for the relevance of his analysis beyond the collapse of the 
USSR. Indeed, the core aim of this paper was to demonstrate the twofold and 
interrelated theoretical and empirical relevance of the link Carr draws between the 
rise of the socialised nation and the crisis of laissez faire due to its loss of legitimacy 
among the lesser privileged. 
Specifically, the paper first argued that Carr’s analysis presents a theoretical 
challenge to the debate on global justice, namely that this debate operates in a 
political vacuum and that, as a result of this vacuum, statist and cosmopolitan 
arguments are implicit in their acceptance of the violence committed by the status quo 
and lack the legitimacy Carr deemed necessary for international justice in the age of 
the socialised nation. The paper then argued that this challenge is empirically 
significant today, as the problem of legitimacy became pressing in the context of 
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Brexit and Trump. The paper thus calls for the statist-cosmopolitan debate on global 
justice to engage more seriously with Carr’s analysis of the crisis of laissez faire and 
the legitimacy problem it raises in the twenty-first century. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Laissez faire in this paper is defined in Carr’s terms: in a broad sense, as the economic system that 
seeks to protect private property, free trade and market. Like Carr, the paper uses the notion 
interchangeably with liberal order and neo-liberal project (to be further justified in section 3). 
2 Ethics and morality are used interchangeably in this paper. 
3 The focus of the paper, therefore, is on the normative dimension in Carr. Keith Smith (2017) contrasts 
this normative / progressive Carr with a later empirical / Rankean-influenced Carr, as exemplified in 
his history of the USSR. 
4 For a review of early critics see Wilson 2000 and Haslam 1999, p. 202-217. For a recent charge see 
Elshtain 2008, 154-5. 
5 For the influence of Dostoyevsky on Carr’s dissatisfaction with nineteenth century liberal rationalism 
see Nishimura 2011. 
6 On this link see also Ashworth 2017. 
7 For this critique, see Babik (2013, 510)’s response to Linklater (1997). 
8 This neglected aspect in Carr’s work presents a response to critics who view Carr’s work as 
Eurocentric (Barkawi and Laffey 2006; Hobson 2012; Howe 1994, 297; Miller 1991, 70; Smith 1992). 
For to Carr the changing conditions from nineteenth century laissez faire meant that ‘former backward 
peoples are no longer passive objects of policy, but its driving forces’ (1951, 96). And nor were the 
former colonies neglected in the Twenty Years’ Crisis, since the role their exploitation played in 
enduring laissez faire was central to the critique of the ‘harmony of interests’. It is thus unclear why to 
post-colonial critics realism offers a Eurocentric account that take[s] the colonies ‘more or less for 
granted’ (Barkawi and Laffey 2006, 346), or a ‘subliminal Eurocentrism’, which ‘banishes from view’ 
the ‘non-Western world’ (Hobson 2012, chapter 3). And while Smith (1992, 65) is correct to argue that 
Carr did not ‘allow for the possibility of a wave of anti-colonial nationalism’ in Nationalism and After, 
Carr incorporated this in his analysis of the colonial revolution, of which Nasser’s social nationalism is 
a case example. 
9 As Nicholas Rengger argues, ‘understandings of what a cosmopolitan theory is and what follows 
from it, differ from one thinker to another’  (2005, 365). 
10 Nor is the context of the social and colonial movements unchanging either. For example, anti-
colonial Nasserite pan-Arab nationalism has been politically defeated in the Arab world since the 
1970s. Thus, after Sadat’s ‘open door’ policy and peace with Israel, Islamists dominated the discourse 
on social justice and anti-colonialism. In the context of Brexit and Trump, it was the success of 
liberalism abroad that undermined it at home, thus leading to social movements that sought democracy 
defined in terms of re-imposing the national and international distinction (Jahn 2018). I would like to 
thank one of my anonymous reviewers for drawing my attention to this contextual elaboration. 	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